The court recognized that under this Court’s decision in Morgan, “each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that act.” Pet. App. 16a (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). The court further concluded that disparate pay cases, unlike hostile work environment claims, involve just such “discrete acts.” Id. 18a.

The court recognized that under this Court’s decision in
Morgan, “each discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock
for filing charges alleging that act.” Pet. App. 16a (quoting
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113). The court further concluded that
disparate pay cases, unlike hostile work environment claims,
involve just such “discrete acts.” Id. 18a.
The court then observed that it was “undisputed that
Ledbetter’s claim is not entirely time barred” because “an
affirmative decision directly affecting Ledbetter’s pay was
made within the limitations period * * * .” Pet. App. 19a.
Whether petitioner should be allowed to challenge any
disparity in her pay that arose from earlier decisions, the court
concluded, was a harder question. Id. 20a. The court
acknowledged that the vast majority of circuits – including
“at least the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits,” id. 20a n.17 – had long relied
on this Court’s decision in Bazemore in holding that “a

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